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Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and am-
bient backscatter communication have been envisioned as two
promising technologies for the Internet-of-things due to their
high spectral efficiency and energy efficiency. Motivated by this
fact, we consider an ambient backscatter NOMA system in
the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. Under some realistic
assumptions of residual hardware impairments (RHIs), channel
estimation errors (CEEs) and imperfect successive interference
cancellation (ipSIC), we investigate the physical layer security
(PLS) of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems focusing on
reliability and security. In order to further improve the security
of the considered system, an artificial noise scheme is proposed
where the radio frequency (RF) source acts as a jammer that
transmits interference signal to the legitimate receivers and
eavesdropper. On this basis, the analytical expressions for the
outage probability (OP) and the intercept probability (IP) are
derived. To gain more insights, the asymptotic analysis and
diversity orders for the OP in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
regime are carried out, and the asymptotic behaviors of the IP in
the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) region are explored
as well. Numerical results show that: 1) RHIs, CEEs and ipSIC
have negative effects on the OP but positive effects on the IP; 2)
Compared with CEEs, RHIs have a more serious impact on the
reliability and security of the considered system; 3) There exists
a trade-off between reliability and security, and this trade-off can
be optimized by reducing the power coefficient of the artificial
noise or increasing the interfering factor of readers; 4) There
are error floors for the OP due to the CEEs and the reflection
coefficient; 5) As MER grows large, the security for Rn and Rf
is improved, while the security for T is reduced.
Index Terms—Internet-of-things, ambient backscatter, NOMA,
residual hardware impairments, physical layer security, channel
estimation errors, imperfect successive interference cancellation,
artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
A large number of intelligent devices will be supported
for the wireless networks with Internet-of-things (IoT) and
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massive machine-type communication [1, 2]. To this end, non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been identified as a
promising solution to serve massive connections due to high
spectral efficiency and low latency [3].1 The distinguishing
feature of NOMA is that a plurality of users are allowed
to occupy the same time/frequency/code resources by power
multiplexing through superposition coding [4]. At the receiver,
the signals can be extracted with the aid of successive interfer-
ence cancellation (SIC) [5]. From the perspective of coverage,
NOMA can enhance the performance of the cell edge users
by allocating more power to them [6].
On a parallel avenue, backscatter communication has
emerged as a promising paradigm for green sustainable IoT
applications due to its ultralow-power and low cost [7]. A
well-known backscatter communication application for the IoT
is radio frequency identification (RFID) that consists of one
reader and one tag. More exactly, the tag modulates and
reflects the incident signal from the energy source through
a mismatched antenna impedance to passively transmit infor-
mation, and the reader performs demodulation after receiving
the reflected signal [8]. However, the traditional backscatter
communication technology is limited by the power consump-
tion resulting from the active transmission [9]. To tackle this
limitation, the work in [10] proposed ambient backscatter
prototypes. This technology utilizes environmental wireless
signals (e.g., digital TV broadcasting or cellular signals) to
collect energy and transmit information through battery-free
tags.
Ambient backscatter technology has drawn great attention
from both academia and industry [11–15]. A framework
for evaluating the ultimate achievable rates of point-to-point
networks with ambient backscatter devices was proposed in
[11], where the impact of the backscatter transmission on the
performance of the legacy systems was considered. In [12],
the authors analyzed the outage performance of the ambient
backscatter communication systems with a pair of passive
tag-reader by deriving the exact and asymptotic expressions
for the outage probability (OP). Guo et al. in [13] exploited
the NOMA technology to support massive tag connections.
According to the unique characteristics of the cooperative
ambient backscatter system, the authors of [14] proposed
three symbiotic transmission schemes, where the relation-
ships between the primary and backscatter transmissions were
1Generally, NOMA can be divided into code-domain NOMA and power-
NOMA. In this paper, we use NOMA to refer to the power-domain NOMA.
2commensal, parasitic, and competitive. The authors in [15]
investigated the effects of co-channel interference and the
energy harvesting (EH) on the achievable OP of the ambient
backscatter communication systems with multiple backscatter
links.
Another well-known fact is that the transmission of wireless
signals is vulnerable to fronted threats due to the broadcast
nature of wireless medium. The traditional key encryption
technologies has high computation complexity, and thus, are
not suitable for small-volume backscatter devices with limited
storage and computing power [16]. As a result, they may not
be applied for solving the security communication problem of
the ambient backscatter NOMA systems [17].
As an alternative, physical layer security (PLS) was pro-
posed as a promising mechanism to ensure the security of
wireless communication systems from an information theo-
retic perspective [18, 19]. By exploiting the inherent random
characteristics of wireless channels, PLS can achieve secure
communication for wireless networks without being eaves-
dropped by illegal eavesdroppers, which has sparked a great
deal of research interests, e.g., see [20–24] and the references
therein. In [20], the secrecy outage performance of a multiple-
relay NOMA network was investigated, where three relay
selection schemes were proposed. With the emphasis on the
cognitive radio networks (CRNs), the authors of [21] evaluated
the reliability-security tradeoff by deriving the connection
outage probability and the secrecy outage probability for the
cooperative NOMA aided CRN systems. Additionally, the
secrecy rate was studied under the traditional backscatter
communications systems in [22], where the reader and eaves-
dropper were equipped with multiple antennas. To enhance the
security of the ambient backscatter communication systems,
an optimal tag selection scheme for the multi-tag ambient
backscatter systems was designed in [23]. By the virtue of
artificial noise, an enhanced PLS scheme for multi-tag ambient
backscatter system was designed, and the bit error rate and
secrecy rate were investigated in [24]. Moreover, the authors
of [25] proposed to combined multiple-input multiple-output
technology with artificial noise technology to enhance the
secrecy performance of NOMA systems.
Unfortunately, the common feature of the aforementioned
contributions is that perfect radio frequency (RF) compo-
nents are assumed, which may not be realistic in practical
communication systems. In practice, all RF front-ends are
vulnerable to several types of hardware impairments due to
the configuration of low cost, low-power dissipation, and
small size components, such as amplifier non-linearities, in-
phase/quadrature imbalance, phase noise, and quantization
error [26–28]. These impairments can be generally eliminated
by using some compensation and calibration algorithms. How-
ever, owing to some factors such as estimation errors, inac-
curate calibration, and time-varying hardware characteristics,
there are still some residual hardware impairments (RHIs),
which can be modeled as an additive distortion noise to the
transmitted/received signals [26]. To this end, a great deal of
works have studied the impact of RHIs on system performance
[28, 29]. In [28], the authors investigated the effects of RHIs
on the achievable sum rate of the unmanned aerial vehicle-
aided NOMA relaying networks. Considering two types of
relay selection schemes, the impacts of RHIs on the multiple-
relay amplify-and-forward network was studied by deriving
the tight closed-form expressions for the OP [29].
Moreover, another limitation of the above research works
is that imperfect channel state information (CSI) is assumed
available at receivers, which is not practical. In fact, it is a
great challenge to obtain perfect channel knowledge due to
channel estimation errors (CEEs) and feedback delay [30].
The related research works about imperfect CSI have been
reported in [31–33]. The outage performance of the down-
link cooperative NOMA systems based on wireless backhaul
unreliability and imperfect CSI was studied by deriving the
exact and asymptotic OP expressions at the receivers [31].
A proportional fair scheduling algorithm was proposed to
achieved high throughput and fairness, which was extended to
the multi-user NOMA scenarios with imperfect CSI in [32].
The authors of [33] considered a more practical scenarios,
where the outage performance of the amplify-and-forward
relay systems was analyzed in the presence of RHIs and CEEs.
Therefore, it is of high practical relevance to look into the
realistic scenario with imperfect CSI and RHIs.
A. Motivation and Contribution
The previous research works have laid a solid foundation
for the analysis of NOMA, ambient backscatter and PLS.
However the joint effects of RHIs, CEEs and imperfect SIC
(ipSIC) on the secure performance of the ambient backscatter
NOMA systems have not yet been well investigated. To fill
this gap, this paper makes an in-depth study of the joint
effects of the three non-ideal factors on the reliability and
the security of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems. In
order to improve the security, we consider an artificial noise
scheme, where the RF source sends the signal and artificial
noise simultaneously. This scheme is feasible since it is carried
out without changing the original system framework [34, 35].
Specifically, the analytical expressions for the OP and the
intercept probability (IP) are derived for the far reader, the
near reader and the tag, respectively. To obtain more insights,
the asymptotic behaviors for the OP in the high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) regime and the asymptotic behaviors for
the IP in the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) region
are explored. The essential contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• We consider a novel secure framework for the ambient
backscatter NOMA systems in the presence of RHIs,
CEEs, and ipSIC. To improve secure performance, an
artificial noise scheme is designed.
• We derive the analytical expressions for the OP and the IP
the far reader, the near reader and the tag to evaluate the
reliability and the security. The results show that a smaller
power coefficient of artificial noise or a larger interfering
factor of readers can enhance the impact of artificial noise
on balancing the trade-off reliability-security.
• In order to obtain deeper insights, we carry out the
asymptotic analysis for the OP in the high SNR region
as well as the diversity orders. Moreover, the asymptotic
3behaviors of the IP in the high MER regime are explored
by introducing the MER. The obtained results indicate
that there are error floors for the OP due to the CEEs
and the reflection coefficient.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the ambient backscatter NOMA
model. In Section III, the reliability is investigated by deriving
the analytical and asymptotic expressions for the OP, while
the expressions of IP are derived to analyze the security. In
Section IV, some numerical results are provided to validate the
correctness of the theoretical analysis. Section V concludes the
paper and summarizes key findings.
We use E {·} to denote the expectation operation. A com-
plex Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance
σ2 reads as CN{µ, σ2}. Pr {·} denotes the probability and
Kv (·) represents the v-th order modified Bessel function of the
second kind, while n! denotes the factorial operation. Finally,
fX(·) and FX(·) are the probability density function (PDF)
and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random
variable, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a downlink ambient
backscatter NOMA system, which consists of one ambient
RF source (S), one tag (T ), two readers (Rf , Rn) and one
eavesdropper (E). In this study, S transmits the signal to
readers and tag in the same resource block. Meanwhile, T
transmits its own information to the readers by reflecting the
signals from S signal, whereas E can intercept the signal
intended for readers. We consider the following assumptions:
i) All the nodes are equipped with a single antenna; ii) RHIs
exist at S, readers and E but not at the tag; iii) All links h
are subject to Rayleigh fading.
Under practical considerations, the perfect CSI may be
unavailable due to some CEEs. The common way to obtain
CSI is channel estimation. For this purpose, by adopting
linear minimum mean square error (MMSE), the channel can
be modeled as hAB = hˆAB + eAB [36], where hˆAB is
the estimated channel of hAB , and eAB ∼ CN
(
0, σ2eAB
)
denotes the corresponding channel estimation errors, where
the variance of CEE σ2eAB indicates the quality of CSI.
To improve the security communication of ambient
backscatter NOMA systems, we consider injecting artificial
noise z (t) with E
(
|z (t)|2
)
= 1 at S. Due to the CEEs,
the artificial noise will cause interference to the readers and
eavesdropper. Then, the superposition message at S can be
written as
xs =
√
a1Psx1 +
√
a2Psx2 +
√
PJz (t) , (1)
where PS is the transmit power for the desired signals at S; a1
and a2 are the power allocation coefficients for the near reader
and the far reader with a1+a2=1 and a1<a2, respectively; x1
and x2 are the corresponding transmitted signals of Rn and Rf
with E
(
|x1|
2
)
=E
(
|x2|
2
)
=1; PJ is the transmitted power
TfR
nR
E
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TagReader
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Fig. 1. Ambient backscatter NOMA system model.
of the artificial noise with PJ = ϕJPS , with ϕJ ∈ (0, 1] as
the power coefficient of artificial noise.
Next, T backscatters the S signal to Rf , Rn and E with
its own signal c (t), with E
(
|c (t)|2
)
= 1. Therefore, Rf , Rn
and E receive the signals from S and the backscattered from
T . Considering the RHIs and CEEs, the received signals at i
(i ∈ (Rf , Rn, E)) can be expressed as
yi = βhTihST (xsc (t) +ηSi)+hSi (xs+ηSi) +ni, (2)
where β is a complex reflection coefficient used to normalize
c (t); ni ∼ CN (0, N0) is the complex additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN); ηSi ∼ CN
(
0, κ2SiPS
)
; κSi denotes the
level of hardware impairment at transceivers, which can be
measured in practice based on the error vector magnitude
(EVM) [37]; hSi, hTi and hST are the channel coefficients
S → i, T → i and S → T , respectively.
According to the NOMA protocol, Rf can decode the
signals x2, and Rn and E can decode the signals x2, x1 and
c (t) in turn with the aid of SIC. In addition, the readers can
only eliminate part of the interference due to the presence
of CEEs. Then, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) of i (i ∈ {Rn, Rf , E}) can be given as2
γx2i =
∣∣∣hˆSi∣∣∣2a2γ
γ
[∣∣∣hˆST∣∣∣2(Bi∣∣∣ˆhTi∣∣∣2+Mi)+Ci∣∣∣ˆhTi∣∣∣2+Qi∣∣∣ˆhSi∣∣∣2+ψi]+1 ,
(3)
γx1i =
∣∣∣hˆSi∣∣∣2a1γ
γ
[∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2(Bi∣∣∣hˆTi∣∣∣2+Mi)+Ci∣∣∣ˆhTi∣∣∣2+Oi∣∣∣hˆSi∣∣∣2+ψi]+1 ,
(4)
2It should be pointed out that Rf only needs to decode its own signal x2,
that is, the SINR of Rf is γ
x2
Rf
.
4γ
c(t)
i =
β2
∣∣∣hˆTi∣∣∣2∣∣∣hˆST ∣∣∣2γ
γ
[∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2(mi∣∣∣ˆhTi∣∣∣2+Mi)+Ci∣∣∣ˆhTi∣∣∣2+ξi∣∣∣ˆhSi∣∣∣2+ψi]+1 ,
(5)
where γ = PS/N0 represents the transmit SNR at S; ε is the
parameter of ipSIC; BRf=β
2
(
1+ ϕ̟J+κ
2
SRf
)
, CRf=BRfσ
2
eST ,
MRf = BRfσ
2
eTRf
, QRf = γ
(
a1 +̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRf
)
, ψRf =
BRfσ
2
eTRf
σ2eST + σ
2
eSRf
(
1 +̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRf
)
; ̟ is the in-
terference factor, reflecting the degree of interference of the
artificial noise to the readers, with 0 ≤ ̟ ≤ 1; BRn =
β2
(
1+̟ϕJ+κ
2
SRn
)
, CRn = BRnσ
2
eST , MRn = BRnσ
2
eTRn
,
QRn = γ
(
a1 +̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRn
)
, ψRn = BRnσ
2
eTRn
σ2eST +
σ2eSRn
(
1 +̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRn
)
, ORn =
(
εa2 +̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRn
)
,
mRn = β
2
(
κ2SRn +̟ϕJ
)
, ξRn =
(
ε+̟ϕJ + κ
2
SRn
)
;
BE = β
2
(
1+ϕJ+κ
2
SE
)
, CE = BEσ
2
eST , ME = BEσ
2
eTE ,
QE = γ
(
a1 + ϕJ + κ
2
SE
)
, ψE = BEσ
2
eTEσ
2
eST +
σ2eSE
(
1 + ϕJ + κ
2
SE
)
, OE =
(
εa2 + ϕJ + κ
2
SE
)
, mE =
β2
(
κ2SE + ϕJ
)
, ξE =
(
ε+ ϕJ + κ
2
SE
)
.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the reliability and security of
the ambient backscatter NOMA systems in term of OP and
IP. In addition, the asymptotic OP and diversity orders in the
high SNR regions are examined, as well as the the asymptotic
IP in the high MER regime.
A. OP Analysis
1) OP for Rf
The outage event occurs at Rf when Rf cannot successfully
decode x2. Thus, the OP at Rf can be expressed as
P
Rf
out = 1− Pr
(
γx2Rf > γ
Rf
th2
)
, (6)
where γ
Rf
th2 is the target rate of Rf .
Theorem 1. For Rayleigh fading channels, the analytical
expression for the OP of the far reader can be obtained as
P
Rf
out=1+∆
Rf
2 e
∆
Rf
1 −∆
Rf
3 −
γ
Rf
th2
λSRf
γ
(
a2−QRf
γ
Rf
th2
)
Ei
(
−∆
Rf
1
)
, (7)
where ∆i1=
(
Miγ
i
th2
λSi(a2−Qiγith2)
+ 1λST
)
λSi(a2−Qiγith2)+λTiCiγith2
λTiBiγith2
,
∆i2 =
λSi(a2−Qiγith2)
λSTλTiBiγith2
, ∆i3 =
ψiγ
i
th2
λSi(a2−Qiγith2)
, (i ∈ {Rn, Rf , E}).
Ei (p) is the exponential integral function [38] and is expressed
by
Ei (p)=
(−p)i−1
(i−1)!
[− ln p+ψ (i)]−
∞∑
m=0
(−p)m
(m−i+1)m!
, (8)
with 

ψ (1) = −υ
ψ (i) = −υ +
i−1∑
m=1
1
m i > 1
, (9)
where ν ≈ 0.577 is the Euler constant.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. At high SNRs, the asymptotic expression for the
OP of Rf of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems is given
as
P
Rf
out,∞ = 1 +∆
Rf
2 e
∆
Rf
1 −∆
Rf
3 Ei
(
−∆
Rf
1
)
. (10)
2) OP for Rn
To successfully decode x1 at Rn, two conditions are needed
to be met simultaneously: 1) Rn can successfully decode
x2; 2) Rn can successfully decode its own information x1.
Therefore, the OP of Rn can be expressed as
PRnout = 1− Pr
(
γx2Rn > γ
Rn
th2, γ
x1
Rn
> γRnth1
)
, (11)
where γRnth1 is the target rate of Rn.
Theorem 2. For Rayleigh fading channels, the analytical
expression for the OP of the near reader can be obtained
as
PRnout=1+
λSRn
λST ςRnλTRnBRn
e
−
(
ςRn
λSRn
γ+∆
Rn
4
)
Ei
(
−∆Rn4
)
, (12)
where ςi = max
{
γith1
a1−Oiγith1
,
γith2
a2−Qiγith2
}
, ∆i4 =
(λST ςiMi+λSi)(λSi+ςiλTiCi)
λSiλST ςiλTiBi
+ ςiψiλSi , (i ∈ {Rn, Rf , E}).
Proof. By substituting (3) and (4) into (11), we can obtain
the result of (12) after some mathematical manipulations, as
in the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. At high SNRs, the asymptotic expression for the
OP of Rn of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems is given
as
PRnout,∞=1+
λSRn
λST ςRnλTRnBRn
e
−
(
ςRn
ψRn
λSRn
+∆Rn4
)
Ei
(
−∆Rn4
)
.
(13)
3) OP for T
The T signals can be successfully decoded when x2 and
x1 are perfectly decoded at Rn. Thus, the OP of BD can be
expressed as
PTout=1−Pr
(
γx2Rn > γ
Rn
th2, γ
x1
Rn
> γRnth1, γ
c(t)
Rn
> γRnthc
)
, (14)
where γthc is the target rate for Rn decoding tag signals.
Theorem 3. For Rayleigh fading channels, we have
• Non-ideal conditions
The analytical expression for the OP of T in (15) is provided
at the top of next page.
In (15), ϑk = cos [(2k − 1)π/ (2N)], N is an accuracy-
complexity trade-off parameter. ∆i5 = β
2 − miγ
i
thc, ∆6 =[
λTRnςRnCRnγ
Rn
thc
(
BRnγγ
Rn
thc+∆5
)
+λSRnγ
Rn
thc∆
Rn
5
]
/
(
∆Rn5 γ
)
,
∆i7 = (λSiξi − λTiCi) γ
i
thc, ∆
i
8 =
(
λTiCiγ
i
thc +∆
i
7
)
γ,
Ai1 =
−1
λSiξiλSTλTi∆i5γ
2 , A
i
2 = −
(
Ciγ
i
thc
λST∆i5
+
Miγ
i
thc
λTi∆i5
)
,
Ai3 =
λTiMi(Ciγγithc)
2
+ (λTiψi∆i5+∆i7Mi)Ciγ2γithc
∆i5
+∆i7ψiγ
2,
Ai4=λ
2
Siξ
2
i γ
i
thc, B1=
λSRn+λST ςRnMRn
λ2SRnλSTλTRnγ∆
Rn
5
+
ςRnCRnBRnγ
Rn
thc
λ2SRnλTRn(∆
Rn
5 )
2 ,
(i ∈ {Rn, Rf , E}), B5 =
(λST ςRnCRn+λSRn )CRnγ
Rn
thc
λSTλSRn∆
Rn
5
+B2 +
5PT,niout = 1−
2λSRn
λTRnλST ςRnBRn
e
−
(
B5+
λTRn
ςRn
BRn
γthc
λSRn
λTRn
γ∆5
+
ςRn
λSRn
γ
) ∞∑
v=1
(−1)v
1
Bv4
(
(B3 +∆6)
B1
) v
2
Kv
(
2
√
(B3 +∆6)B1
)
+
λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λSTλTRn∆
Rn
5
eA
Rn
2

π
N
N∑
k=0
e
−
(
2(ARn3 +∆
Rn
8 )
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
−A
Rn
1
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
2
)√
1−ϑ2k
(
1
ϑk+3
−
1
ϑk+1
)
+2K0
(
2
√
−ARn1
(
ARn3 +∆
Rn
8
)) .
(15)
B2 =
2ςRnBRnMRnCRn
(
γRnthc
)2
λSRn
(
∆Rn5
)2 +(λBDn ςRnCRnMRn + λSRnMRn + λBRnςRnBRnψRn) γRnthcλSRnλBRn∆Rn5 , (16)
B3 =
[
λTRn ςRnMRnC
2
Rnγ
(
γRnthc
)2 (
BRnγ
Rn
thc +∆
Rn
5
)
+ (λSRnMRn + λTRnςRnBRnψRn)CRnγ
(
∆Rn5 γ
Rn
thc
)2]
/
(
∆Rn5
)2
+ (λTRn ςRnCRn + λSRn)ψRnγγ
Rn
thc, (17)
B4 =
[
ςRnλSRnλBRnCRnγ
(
BRnγ
Rn
thc +∆
Rn
5
)
+ λ2SRn∆
Rn
5 γ
]
/ (ςRnBRn) . (18)
ςRnψRn
λSRn
, where B2, B3 and B4 are provided at the top of the
next page.
• Ideal conditions
For ideal conditions, the analytical expression for the OP
of the BD in (19) is provided at the top of next page.
In (19), ∆9 =
λSRn
λTRnλST ςRnBRn
, ∆10 =
(ϑk+1)γ
Rn
thc
2λTRnλST γ∆
Rn
5
,
∆11 =
λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λTRnλST∆
Rn
5
, and ∆12 =
(ϑk+1)γ
Rn
thc
2λTRnλST γ∆
Rn
5
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 3. At high SNRs, the asymptotic expressions for
the OP of T of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems can
be expressed as
• Non-ideal conditions
For ideal conditions, the asymptotic expression for the OP
of the BD in (20) is provided at the top of next page.
• Ideal conditions
PT,idout,∞ = 1 +∆9e
∆9Ei (−∆9)−∆11e
∆11Ei (−∆11) . (21)
Next, in order to obtain more insights, the diversity orders
for Rf , Rn and T are investigated, which can be defined as
[39]:
d = − lim
γ→∞
log (P∞out)
log γ
. (22)
Corollary 4. The diversity orders of Df , Dn and BD are
given as:
dRf = dRn = d
id
T = d
ni
T = 0. (23)
Remark 1. From Corollary 1-Corollary 4, we can obtain
that: 1) RHIs, CEEs and ipSIC have detrimental effects on the
reliability of the considered systems; 2) The asymptotic outage
performance of the Rf , Rn and T become a constant when
the transmit SNR is in a high state, indicating that there are
error floors for the OP; 3) From Eq. (23), it can be observed
that the diversity orders of the considered system are zero due
to the fixed constant for the OP in the high SNR regime.
B. IP Analysis
User i (i ∈ {Rf , Rn, T}) will be intercepted if E
can successfully wiretap j’s signal, i.e., γpE > γ
E
thj , p ∈
{x2, x1, c (t)}, j ∈ (2, 1, c). Thus, the IP of i by E can be
expressed as
P iint = Pr
(
γpE > γ
E
thj
)
, (24)
where γEthj is the secrecy SNR threshold of i.
Theorem 4. The analytical expressions for the IP of the far
reader, the near reader and T can be respectively obtained as
For the far and near readers, we have
P
Rf
int=−∆
E
2 e
∆E1−∆E3−
γE
th2
λSEγ(a2−QEγEth2) Ei
(
−∆E1
)
, (25)
PRnint = −∆16e
∆17−∆18−
γEth2
λSEγ(a1−OEγEth2) Ei (−∆17) , (26)
where ∆17 =
(
MEγth2
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)
+ 1λST
)
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)+λTECEγEth2
λTEBEγEth2
,
∆16 =
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)
λSTλTEBEγEth2
, and ∆18 =
ψEγ
E
th2
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)
.
For T, we have
• Non-ideal conditions
For non-ideal conditions, the analytical expression for the
IP of T in (27) is at the top of next page.
In (27), ∆13 = 1/
(
λSTλTE∆
E
5
)
, ∆14 =
CEγ
E
thc(λST+λTE)
λTEλST∆E5
,
and ∆15 =
C2E(γEthc)
2
/(λTE∆E5 )
∆E5
+
(
ψE +
1
γ
)
γEthc.
• Ideal conditions
For ideal conditions, the analytical expression for the IP of
T in (28) is at the top of next page.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Moreover, for further investigation of the ambient backscat-
ter NOMA secure communication systems, we also study the
asymptotic behaviors of IP in the high MER region [40]. MER
6PT,idout =1 +∆9e
∆9−
ςRn
λSRn
γ Ei (−∆9) +
γRnthcπ
NλTRnλST γ∆
Rn
5
N∑
k=0
e
−
(
ςRnBRn∆10+
ςRn
λSRn
γ
)
K0
(
2
√
∆10
)√
1− ϑ2k
−∆11e
∆11+
1
λSRn
γξRn Ei (−∆11)−
γRnthcπ
NλTRnλST γ∆
Rn
5
N∑
k=0
e
1
λSRn
γξRn
− ϑk+1
2λSRn
γξRn K0
(
2
√
∆10
)√
1− ϑ2k. (19)
PT,niout,∞ =−
λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λSTλTDn∆5
eA
Rn
2

π
N
N∑
k=0
e
−
(
2A
Rn
3
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
−A
Rn
1
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
2
)√
1−ϑ2k
(
1
ϑk+3
+
1
ϑk+1
)
−2K0
(
2
√
−ARn1 A
Rn
3
)
+
2λSRn
λTRnλST ςRnBRn
e−B5
∞∑
v=1
(−1)v
1
Bv4
(
B3
B1
) v
2
Kv
(
2
√
B3B1
)
. (20)
PT,niint =−
λSEξEγ
E
thc
λSTλTE∆E5
eA
E
2

π
N
N∑
k=0
e
−
(
2(AE3+∆E8)
AE
4 (ϑk+1)
−A
E
1
AE
4 (ϑk+1)
2
)√
1−ϑ2k
(
1
ϑk+3
−
1
ϑk+1
)
+2K0
(
2
√
−AE1
(
AE3 +∆
E
8
))
+ 2
√
∆15∆13e
−∆14K1
(
2
√
∆13∆15
)
. (27)
TABLE I
TABLE OF PARAMETERS FOR NUMERICAL RESULTS.
Power sharing coefficients of NOMA a1 = 0.2, a2 = 0.8
Noise power N0 = 1
Reflection coefficient β = 0.1
ipSIC parameter ε = 0.01
Power coefficient of artificial noise ϕJ = 0.1
Interfering factor of readers ̟ = 0.5
RHIs parameter κSRf = κSRn = κSE = κ = 0.1
Channel fading parameters
{
λSRf , λSRn , λSB, λSE , λTRf , λTRnλTE
}
= {4, 6, 1, 0.5, 1, 2, 0.3}
CEEs parameter σ2eSRf
= σ2eSRn
= σ2eSB = σ
2
eSE
= σ2eTRf
= σ2eTRn
= σ2eTE = σ
2
e = 0.05
Targeted data rates (OP)
{
γ
Rn
th1
, γ
Rn
th2
= γ
Rf
th2
, γ
Rn
thc
}
= {1.2, 1, 0.001}
Targeted data rates (IP)
{
γE
th1
, γE
th2
, γE
thc
}
= {0.12, 0.3, 0.01}
PT,idint =1−
πγEthc
NλSTλTEγ∆E5
N∑
k=0
(ϑk + 1)K0
(
(ϑk + 1)
√
γEthc
λSTλTEγ∆E5
)√
1− ϑ2k
−
2
λSTλTE
e
1
λSEξEγ
∫ ∞
γE
thc
∆E
5
e
− ∆
E
5 y
λSEξEγ
E
thcK0
(
2
√
y
λSTλTE
)
dy. (28)
is introduced to distinguish the channel state of the main link
and eavesdropping link, being defined as λme =
λST
λTE
.
Corollary 5. At high MERs, the asymptotic expression for the
IP of Rf of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems is given
as
P
Rf
int,∞=−∆2
′e
∆1
′−∆3′−
γEth2
λSEγ(a2−QEγEth2)
(
1+b1
′)Ei(−(∆1′+b1′)) ,
(29)
where ∆1
′= MEλTEBE +
MECEγ
E
th2
λSE(a2−QEγEth2)BE
, ∆2
′ =
λSE(a2−QEγEth2)
λmeλ2TEBEγ
E
th2
,
∆3
′= ψEγ
E
th2
λSE(a2−QEγEth2)
, and b1
′=
λSE(a2−QEγEth2)+λTECEγEth2
λmeλ2TEBEγ
E
th2
.
Proof. The proof follows by taking λme large in (29) and
simplifying the expressions by utilizing ex ≈ 1+ x if x→ 0.
Similarly, we can also obtain (30).
Corollary 6. At high MERs, the asymptotic expression for the
IP of Rn of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems is given
as
PRnint,∞ = −∆16
′e
∆17
′−∆18′−
γEth2
λSEγ(a1−OEγEth2)
×
(
1 + b2
′)Ei (− (∆17′ + b2′)) , (30)
7where ∆17
′= MEλTEBE +
MECEγ
E
th2
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)BE
,∆16
′=
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)
λmeλ2TEBEγ
E
th2
,
∆18
′= ψEγ
E
th2
λSE(a1−QEγEth2)
, and b2
′=
λSE(a1−OEγEth2)+λTECEγEth2
λmeλ2TEBEγ
E
th2
.
Corollary 7. At high MERs, the asymptotic expression for
the IP of T of the ambient backscatter NOMA systems can be
written by
• Non-ideal conditions
For non-ideal conditions, the asymptotic expression for the
OP of the BD in (31) is provided at the top of next page.
In (31), A1
′ = − 1
λSE ξE λme λ2TE∆
E
5 γ
2 , ∆13
′ = 1
λme λ2TE ∆
E
5
,
K1
(
2
√
∆13
′∆15
)
≈I1
(
2
√
∆13
′∆15
)(
ln
(√
∆13
′∆15
)
+υ
)
+
1
2
(√
∆13
′∆15
)−1
− 12
∑3
l=0
(
√
∆13′∆15)
2l+1
l!(l+1)
(∑l
k=1
1
k+
∑l+1
k=1
1
k
)
.3
• Ideal conditions
For Ideal conditions, the analytical expression for the IP of
T in (32) is provided at the top of next page.
Proof. The proof follows by taking λme large in (31) and (32)
and simplifying the expressions by utilizing e−x ≈ 1− x and
K0 (x) ≈ −ln (x) if x→ 0.
Remark 2. From Theorem 4 and Corollary 5-Corollary 7,
the following observations can be inferred: 1) RHIs, CEEs
and ipSIC can enhance the security of the ambient backscatter
NOMA systems; 2) When the reflection coefficient β increases,
both P
Rf
int and P
Rn
int decrease, while P
T
int increases; 3) Increas-
ing ϕJ can reduce the IP, thereby improving the reliability-
security trade-off of the considered systems; 4) as λme grows,
the security for Rn and Rf is improved, while the security for
T is reduced.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are provided to verify
the correctness of our theoretical analysis in Section III. The
results are verified by using Monte Carlo simulations with 106
trials. Unless otherwise stated, we set the parameters as shown
in Table I is at the top of the previous page.
Fig. 2 plots the OP and the IP versus the transmit SNR for
the far reader, the near reader and T, with κ = 0.1 and σ2e =
0.05. For comparison, the considered system performance of
ideal conditions is provided with κ = 0 and σ2e = 0. It is
shown that the theoretical results match well the simulations
across the entire SNR region. We can also observe that the
OP approaches a fixed constant due to the fixed estimation
error and β in the high SNR region, which results in zero
diversity order. These results verify the conclusion in Remark
1. Moreover, RHIs have a positive impact on IP, which reveals
that the ideal communication systems are more vulnerable to
be eavesdropped than the non-ideal communication systems.
Finally, we can also see that there exists a trade-off between
reliability and security.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the impact of OP versus IP for different
power coefficient of the artificial noise ϕJ and attenuation
factor ̟, with ϕJ = {0.1, 0.4} and ̟ = {0.2, 0.05}. In this
simulation, we assume κ = 0 and σ2e = 0. One can observe
3For large MER, in order to achieve a better approximation effect, we only
need to consider the first three terms of l, i.e. l = 1, 2, 3.
that as the power coefficient of the artificial noise ϕJ grows
smaller, the reliability-security tradeoff of the considered sys-
tem degrades significantly. This is because the interference
signals at eavesdropper become more dominant, resulting in a
higher IP. Similarly, the interference factor ̟ of the readers
increases so as to result in a higher OP, which indicates that
the reliability-security tradeoff degrades obviously. It is noted
that the IP of T is the smallest, implying that T has the most
secure performance. Therefore, in order to improve reliability-
security tradeoff of the system by artificial noise, the design
with a greater power coefficient of the artificial noise and
smaller interference factor of the reader is more important.
Fig. 4 presents the OPs andIPs versus RHIs κ and CEEs
σ2e . In this simulation, we set SNR = 25 dB and ϕ
Rn
J =
0.05 for the OP, while SNR = 5 dB and ϕEJ = 0.2 for IP.
According to Fig.4 (a) and (b), it is clear that as κ grows, P
Rf
out,
PRnout and P
T
out increase, while P
Rf
int , P
Rn
int and P
T
int decrease.
Likewise, with an increasing σ2e , the OPs of Rf , Rn and T
increase, whereas those of the corresponding IPs decrease. It
means that the reliability of T is the worst, while it has better
security. Moreover, for Rf , Rn and T , the fluctuation for the
OP and IP of RHIs is more obvious than that of CEEs, which
shows that the reliability and security of the readers are more
dependent on the ability of RHIs. Finally, we can also observe
that as RHIs change, the OP of far reader changes drastically.
In contrast, the change of OP of T is the least obvious, most
probably because T eliminate part of interference caused by
the far and near readers.
Fig. 5 illustrates the OP and IP versus the transmit SNR
for different ε and β, respectively. In this simulation, we set:
ε = {0, 0.05}, β = {0.2, 0.12} for OP; ε = {0, 0.3}, β =
{0.1, 0.3} for IP. As can be seen in Fig. 5 (a), the error floors
for the OP happen at high transmit SNR. The OP decreases
as the transmit SNR increases, and depends on the value of
ε and β. More specifically, under perfect SIC (ε = 0), the
outage behaviors of Rf , Rn and T improve remarkably when
β increases; similarly, for a fixed β, the increase of ε also leads
to lower reliability of Rn and T . By comparing Fig. 5 (a) with
5 (b), we can observe that ε and β have opposite effects on
IP for the far reader, near reader, and T , while β has identical
effects on T, i.e., the increase of β reduces the security of T .
It is worth noting that OPs of Rf and Rn are more sensitive
to β, which is due to the increase of interference from the
backscatter link. For IP, T is more sensitive to β. This happens
because when β increases, E is more likely to eavesdrop the
information of c (t) successfully.
Fig. 6 presents the IP versus MER for Rf , Rn, and T under
ideal conditions with κ = 0, σ2e = 0, as well as non-ideal
conditions with κ = 0.1, σ2e = 0.05. In this simulation, we set
SNR = 5 dB, λTE = 2, and
{
γEth1, γ
E
th2, γ
E
thc
}
= {0.3, 0.3, 1}.
From Fig. 6, we can observe that the asymptotic results are
strict approximation of the IP in the high MER regime and the
RHIs can enhance the security of Rf , Rn, and T . In addition,
the IP of Rf is much larger than that of Rn when Rf and
Rn have the same target rate, which is due to the fact that Rf
allocates more power. Therefore, considering the small power
allocation coefficients a1 and high target rate γ
E
th1 of the Rn,
8PT,niint,∞ = −
πλSEξEγ
E
thc
Nλmeλ2TE∆
E
5
e
−MEγ
E
thc
λTE∆
i
5
(
1−
CEγ
E
thc
λmeλTE∆E5
) N∑
k=0
e
−
2(AE3 +∆E8 )
AE
4 (ϑk+1)
(
1+
A1
′AE4 (ϑk + 1)
2
)√
1−ϑ2k
(
1
ϑk + 3
−
1
ϑk + 1
)
+
λSEξEγ
E
thc
λmeλ2TE∆
E
5
e
−MEγ
E
thc
λTE∆
i
5
(
1−
CEγ
E
thc
λmeλTE∆E5
)
ln
(√
−AE1
(
AE3 +∆
E
8
))
+2
√
∆15∆13
′K1
(
2
√
∆13
′∆15
)
e
− CEγ
E
thc
λTE∆
E
5
(
1−
CEγ
E
thc
λmeλTE∆E5
)
.
(31)
PT,idint,∞ =1+
πγEthc
Nλmeλ2TEγ∆
E
5
N∑
k=0
(ϑk + 1) ln
(
ϑk + 1
2
√
γEthc
λmeλ2TEγ∆
E
5
)√
1− ϑ2k
+
2
λmeλ2TE
e
1
λSEξEγ
∫ ∞
γE
thc
∆E
5
e
− ∆
E
5 y
λSEξEγ
E
thc ln
(√
y
λmeλ2TE
)
dy. (32)
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Fig. 2. OP and IP versus the transmit SNR.
10-1 100
10-2
10-1
100
: 0.4, 0.2
   : 0.1, 0.2
  : 0.4, 0.05
J
J
J
black
red
blue
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Outage Probability
nR
fR
T
 Simulation
 Analysis
Fig. 3. IP versus OP for different power coefficient of artificial noise ϕJ .
it is difficult for the information of Rn to be eavesdropped
by E. Finally, we can also observe that as MER grows, the
security for Rn and Rf is improved, while the security for T
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Fig. 4. OP and IP versus RHIs and CEEs.
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(a) OP versus the transmit SNR for different ε and β.
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(b) IP versus the transmit SNR for different ε and β.
Fig. 5. OP and IP versus the transmit SNR for different ε and β.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigates the joint impacts of RHIs,
CEEs and ipSIC on the reliability and the security of the
ambient backscatter NOMA systems in terms of OP and IP. To
improve the security performance, an artificial noise scheme
was proposed, where the RF source simultaneously sends the
signal and artificial noise to the readers and tag. The analytical
expressions for the OP and the IP were derived. Furthermore,
the asymptotic OP in the high SNR regime and the asymptotic
IP in the high MER region are analyzed. The simulation
results show that although RHIs, CEEs and ipSIC all have
a significant negative impact for the OP of the far reader, near
reader, and tag, they have a obvious positive effect for the IP
on the three devices. In addition, the increase of β will reduce
the reliability and enhance the security for far reader and near
reader. Finally, we can conclude that the optimal reliability-
security tradeoff performance can be achieved by adjusting
the power coefficient of the artificial noise and interference
factor of the reader, which further drives ambient backscatter
application in the IoT networks.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Substituting (3) into (6), the OP of Rf can be expressed as
P
Rf
out = 1− Pr
(
γx2Rf > γ
Rf
th2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
, (A.1)
where I1 is calculated as follows:
I1 = Pr
(
γx2Rf > γ
Rf
th2
)
=
∫ ∞
α1
1
λSRf
e
− xλSDf 1
λTRf
e
− yλTRf 1
λST
e
− zλST dxdydz
u=z+α
= ∆
Rf
2 e
∆
Rf
1 −∆
Rf
3 −
γ
Rf
th2
λSRf
γ
(
a2−QRf
γ
Rf
th2
) ∫ ∞
α
e−α3u
1
u
du
l1=1+∆
Rf
2 e
∆
Rf
1 −∆
Rf
3 −
γ
Rf
th2
λSRf
γ
(
a2−QRf
γ
Rf
th2
)
Ei
(
−∆
Rf
1
)
, (A.2)
where α1 =
(BRf z+CRf )γγ
Rf
th2y+MRf γγ
Rf
th2z+(ψRf+1)γγ
Rf
th2
(a2−QRf γth2)γ
,
α2 =
λSRf
(
a2−QRf γ
Rf
th2
)
+λTRfCRf γ
Rf
th2
λTRfBRf γ
Rf
th2
, α3 =
MRf γ
Rf
th2
λSRf (a2−QRf γth2)
+ 1λST , and the step l1 is obtained
by utilizing [41, Eq. (3.352)]. Finally, substituting (A.2) into
(A.1), we can obtain (7).
Similarly, substituting (3) and (4) into (11), the (12) can be
obtained.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Substituting (3), (4) and (5) into (14), the OP of T can be
expressed as
PTout=1−Pr
(
γx2Rn>γ
Rn
th2, γ
x1
Rn
> γRnth1, γ
c(t)
Rn
> γRnthc
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
, (B.1)
• Non-ideal conditions
For non-ideal conditions, I2 is calculated as (A.2), shown
at the top of the next page.
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I2=Pr

ςRnγ
[(
BRn
∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2+CRn
)∣∣∣ˆhTRn∣∣∣2+MRn∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2+ψRn+1γ
]
<
∣∣∣ˆhSRn∣∣∣2<
(
∆Rn5
∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2−CRnγRnthc
)∣∣∣ˆhTRn∣∣∣2−MRn∣∣∣ˆhST∣∣∣2γRnthc−(NRn+1γ)γRnthc
ξRnγ
Rn
thc


=
∫ ∞
CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
∫ ∞
MRn
γ
Rn
thc
z+(ψRn+1γ)γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
z−CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∫ (∆Rn5 z−CRnγRnthc)y−MRnγthcz−(ψRn+1/γ)γRnthc
ξRn
γ
Rn
thc
ςRn [(BRnz+CRn)y+MRnz+ψRn+1γ ]
1
λSRn
e
− xλSRn
1
λTRn
e
− yλTRn
1
λST
e
− zλST dxdydz
=
∫ ∞
CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
∫ ∞
MRn
γ
Rn
thc
z+(ψRn+ 1γ )γ
Rn
thc
∆
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5
z−CRn
γ
Rn
thc
e
− 1λSRn ςRn [(BRnz+CRn)y+MRnz+ψRn+
1
γ ] 1
λTRn
e
− yλTRn
1
λST
e
− zλST dydz
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I21
−
∫ ∞
CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
∫ ∞
MRn
γ
Rn
thc
z+(ψRn+ 1γ )γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
z−CRn
γ
Rn
thc
e
−(
∆
Rn
5
z−CRn
γ
Rn
thc)y−MRnγ
Rn
thc
z−(ψRn+1/γ)γ
Rn
thc
λSRn
ξDn
γ
Rn
thc
1
λTRn
e
− yλTRn
1
λST
e
− zλST dydz
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I22
. (B.2)
By using some mathematical manipulations, we can obtain
I21 =
∫ ∞
CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
α5e
−
ςRn(MRnz+ψRn+ 1γ )
λSRn
−α4 1
λST
e
− zλST dz
=
∫ ∞
0
λSRn
λTRnλST ςRnBRn
e−α6
1
u+B4
e−(B1u+
B3+∆6
u )du
=
λSRn
λTRnλST ςTRn
e−B6
∞∑
v=1
(−1)v
1
Bn4
∫ ∞
0
uv−1e−(B1u+
B3+∆6
u )du
l2=
2λSRn
λTRnλSTςRnBRn
e−α6
∞∑
v=1
(−1)v
1
Bv4
(
(B3+∆6)
B1
) v
2
Kv
(
2
√
(B3+∆6)B1
)
,
(B.3)
where u = λSRnλTRn∆
Rn
5 z − λSRnλTRnCRnγ
Rn
thc , α4 =
[λTRn ςRn(BRnz+CRn )+λSRn ](ψRn+ 1γ )γ
Rn
thc+MRnγ
Rn
thcz
λSRnλTRn(∆
Rn
5 z−CRnγ
Rn
thc)
, α5 =
λSRn
λTRn ςRn(BRnz+CRn)+λSRn
, α6 = B5 +
λTRnςRnBRnγ
Rn
thc
λSRnλTRnγ∆5
+
ςRn
λSRnγ
, and l2 is obtained by utilizing [14, Eq. (3.471)].
I22=
∫ ∞
CRn
γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5
e
ψRn
+1
γ
λSRn
ξRn
+
(
MRn
λSRn
ξRn
− 1λST
)
z−α7 λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λST
(
λTRn∆
Rn
5 z+∆
Rn
7
)dz
=
λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λSTλTRn∆
Rn
5
eA
Rn
2
∫ ∞
o
e
−
(
(−ARn1 )u+
A
Rn
3
+∆
Rn
8
u
)
1
u+ARn4
du
=
λSRnξRnγ
Rn
thc
λSTλTRn∆
Rn
5
eA
Rn
2


∫ ARn4
o
e−((−A5)u+
A3
u ) 1
u+ARn4
du︸ ︷︷ ︸
l3
+
∫ ∞
ARn4
e
−
(
(−ARn1 )u+
A
Rn
3
+∆
Rn
8
u
)
1
u+ARn4
du︸ ︷︷ ︸
l4

 , (B.4)
where u = λSRnξRnλTRn∆
Rn
5 z − λSRnξRnλTRnCRnγ
Rn
thc,
α7 =
(λTRn∆
Rn
5 z+∆
Rn
7 )(ψRn+1/γ+MRnz)
λSRnξRnλTRn [∆
Rn
5 z−CRnγ
Rn
thc ]
, and
l3 can be approximated by the Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature [42], i.e., l3 ≈
pi
N
∑N
k=0
1
(ϑk+3)
e
−
(
2(ARn3 +∆
Rn
8 )
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
−A
Rn
1
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
2
)√
1− ϑ2k.
Next, due to ARn4 ≤ 1, l4 can be expressed as
l4 ≈
∫ ∞
ARn4
e
−
(
(−ARn1 )u+
A
Rn
3
+∆
Rn
8
u
)
1
u
du
=
∫ ∞
0
e
−
(
(−ARn1 )u+
A
Rn
3
+∆
Rn
8
u
)
1
u
du
−
∫ ARn4
0
e
−
(
(−ARn1 )u+
A
Rn
3
+∆
Rn
8
u
)
1
u
du
=2K0
(
2
√
−ARn1
(
ARn3 +∆
Rn
8
))
−
π
N
N∑
k=0
1
ϑk+1
e
−
(
2(ARn3 +∆
Rn
8 )
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
−A
Rn
1
A
Rn
4 (ϑk+1)
2
)√
1−ϑ2k. (B.5)
By substituting l3 and (B.5) into (B.4), I22 can be obtained;
substituting (B.3) and (B.4) into (B.2), I2 can be derived.
• Ideal conditions
Substituting κ = 0 and σ2e = 0 into (3), (4) and (5), CRf =
MRf = CRn = MRn = 0. Then, the OP of T under ideal
conditions is given at the top of next page.
In (B.6), I31 can be obtained by utilizing [41, Eq. (6.611)], I32
can be approximated by the Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature
[42]. Thus, I31 and I32 can be expressed as
I31=∆11e
∆11+
1
λSRn
γξRnEi(−∆11)−∆9e
∆9−
ςRn
λSRn
γEi(−∆9) , (B.7)
I32 =
γRnthcπ
NλTRnλST γ∆
Rn
5
N∑
k=0
K0
(
2
√
∆10
)√
1− ϑ2k×[
e
−
(
ςRnBRn∆10+
ςRn
λSRn
γ
)
−e
1
λSRn
γξRn
− ϑk+1
2λSRn
γξRn
]
. (B.8)
Similarly, substituting (B.7) and (B.8) into (B.6), we can
obtain PT,idout .
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PT,idout = 1−
∫ ∞
(ψRn+1/γ)γ
Rn
thc
∆
Rn
5

e− ςRn(BRny+ψRn)λSRn − e−∆
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5
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Rn
thc
λSRn
ξRn
γ
Rn
thc

 2
λSTλTRn
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(
2
√
y
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)
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= 1−
∫ ∞
0

e− ςRn(BRny+ψRn)λSRn − e−∆
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5
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Rn
thc
λSRn
ξRn
γ
Rn
thc

 2
λSTλTRn
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(
2
√
y
λSTλTRn
)
dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I31
+
∫ (ψRn+1/γ)γRnthc
∆
Rn
5
0

e− ςRn(BRny+ψRn)λSRn − e−∆
Rn
5
y−(ψRn+1/γ)γ
Rn
thc
λSRn
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γ
Rn
thc

 2
λSTλTRn
K0
(
2
√
y
λSTλTRn
)
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︸ ︷︷ ︸
I32
. (B.6)
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
According to I1, we can obtain P
Rf
int and P
Rn
int . Substituting
(5) into (24), the IP of T can be expressed as
• Non-ideal conditions
PT,niint =
∫ ∞
CEγ
E
thc
∆E
5
∫ ∞
MEγ
E
thc
z+(ψE+1γ)γEthc
∆E
5
z−CEγ
E
thc
1
λTEλST
e
−
(
y
λTE
+ zλST
)
dydz−
∫ ∞
CEγ
E
thc
∆E
5
∫ ∞
MEγ
E
thc
z+(ψE+1γ)γEthc
∆E
5
z−CEγ
E
thc
e
−(
∆E5 z−CEγ
E
thc)y−MEγEthcz−(ψE+1γ)γEthc
λSEξEγ
E
thc
×
1
λTE
e
− yλTE
1
λST
e
− zλST dydz. (C.1)
Similar to the derivation process of I22, after some mathe-
matical manipulations, PT,niint can be obtained.
• Ideal conditions
Substituting κ = 0 and σ2e = 0 into (5), CE = ME = 0.
Then, the IP of T at the ideal conditions is given by
PT,idint =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γE
thc
γ∆E
5
(
1− e−
∆E5 γy−γ
E
thc λSEξEγγ
E
thc
)
2
λTEλST
K0
(
2
√
y
λTEλST
)
dy, (C.2)
After some mathematical manipulations, we can obtain
PT,idint .
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